Chapter 4 Compassion in primary and community healthcare by Hordern, Joshua
Handbook of Primary Care Ethics
Edited by










Compassion in primary and 
community healthcare
JOSHUA HORDERN
COMPASSION IN PRIMARY AND COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE
Compassion is an attribute of a person’s affective understanding, which aims to enable, so far 
as possible, shared experiences of the world’s ills and some alleviation of those ills’ effects. 
Such an attribute is thus of great value within healthcare institutions such as general prac-
tices and other primary and community healthcare settings. It may characterise the people 
who participate in those institutions; or, it may not so characterise them. The appearance 
of compassion, under certain conditions and even in fragile and incomplete forms, is a kind 
of human excellence, a way of being for the good in community.* Compassion is not, there-
fore, a commodity, to be bought, sold and traded. Although time can be costed, there is no 
line for compassion in any budget. Were compassion to be thought a commodity, one could 
imagine trading it off against some more measurable factor (efficiency, cost-effectiveness, etc.). 
However, our human capacity for compassion, though fragile, tends to resist such marginali-
sation and reductionism.
As an attribute of human affective understanding aiming at shared experience amidst life’s 
illness, compassion is cognitive, participative and alleviative. As an affection, compassion is not 
reducible to mere sensation, although it may coincide with physical expressions such as weeping 
or reassuring touch. Rather, compassion is centrally an affective attitude towards someone’s 
suffering, a core dimension of the ‘partnership-working’ crucial to patient– practitioner rela-
tionships in the ‘new professionalism’ of health and social care.1 The affectivity of compas-
sion does not entail that it is somehow non-rational or anti-rational. Rather, compassion is 
directed towards situations, people or things with which it is concerned. This directedness 
or ‘aboutness’ of compassion indicates that we can ask questions about its intelligibility and 
reasonableness  – whether understanding of an individual’s suffering is being appropriately 
grasped and communicated in this case. This ability to assess compassion strongly suggests 
* For this account of fragile virtue, see Ref. 2. 
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Compassion in primary and community healthcare
that it is in some way cognitive, involving a kind of belief or mental attitude. Precisely as cogni-
tive, it can initiate reasoning towards action which will constitute the alleviation of suffering.
If this is so, compassion cannot be reserved or detached. Compassion alleviates suffering 
by participating in it. As an essentially alleviative affection, it reaches out in understanding 
and embodied service to engage with persons in need. In compassion, one person relates their 
self to the other, seeking to share in understanding of that other’s experience of the suffering 
human condition.* Just because of its quality as a kind of intelligent understanding rather than 
an inscrutable sensation, compassion may constitute an experience which is intelligibly shared 
by both sufferer and carer, leading to shared decision and action. However, this participative, 
alleviative sharing in suffering is not automatic. It is a goal to be achieved in the everyday 
encounters of healthcare.
Since compassion is like this, its content is not fixed but filtered through the circumstances 
and beliefs of those concerned. Accordingly, compassion is quite different from a healthcare 
professional’s self-indulgent emoting, which signals his or her own self-regard instead of 
aiming at shared experience. More emotion does not equate to better compassion; ill-focussed 
emoting is worse than detached but efficient practice. However, intelligent, well-directed affec-
tion can enable practice that is humane and effective.
This description of compassion focusses compassion not chiefly on specific practical mani-
festations of concern important though they are – the accessibility of an elderly person’s home, 
the practicability of contacting a general practitioner (GP) out of hours and the glass of water 
within reach – but on persons’ deeper experiences of illness, disease and care. Participation by 
compassion in that deeper level is cognitive and affective, and only thus can it be alleviative. 
For the logic of compassion is that suffering involves loss of some goodness in human life. In 
healthcare, alleviation of suffering might not involve action beyond kindly presence aimed at 
reassurance of solidarity and relief of fear: the health visitor or GP having that second cup of tea 
with the lonely person so that their story is properly heard. Or, it may involve extensive activity 
aimed at diagnosis and healing of disease. However, both of these forms of alleviation are initi-
ated by an affective, cognitive participation in suffering, aiming at the shared experience both 
of suffering and of some goodness by the one who has lost or never known it.
Compassion is, therefore, not an optional extra but a necessary and in some fashion ever- 
present quality of healthcare, central to its goals. To construe the term ‘concordance’, a term 
which  complements ‘compliance’ or ‘adherence’, in terms of the moral psychology of shared 
decision-making, compassion involves being united affectively with another in their  experience 
of the world’s ills, in their suffering.† As a systematic review of evidence has shown below, 
such  ‘emotional rapport and support [are] … associated with improvements in emotional health, 
* For this account of affectivity in more detail, see Refs. 3 and 4.
† For a brief introduction to these terms, see Ref. 5.
Elements of compassion
 ▪ Cognitive-affective – We understand each person’s experience of suffering, listening in love.
 ▪ Participative – We seek, so far as possible, to share that experience, being bodily present in service.
 ▪ Alleviative – We think about how to make things better, looking forward in hope.
 ▪ Persuasive – We talk, helping one another understand suffering differently and better.
 ▪ Civic – We encounter each other as citizens in ‘secular’ solidarity, being alert to power, justice 
and culture.
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symptom resolution, physical functioning and quality of life assessments, as well as  … 
measures … such as physiological indicators of disease management … and pain control’.6
Primary and community healthcare’s practices such as listening, visiting, discussing, 
advising, comforting, recommending, prescribing and referring concern encounters between 
persons amidst life’s drudgery, drama and hypochondria. Persons engaging in such every-
day practices encounter one another in ways which bear witness to their profound human 
unity amidst vulnerability and suffering. For these practices enflesh human solidarity as some-
body inclines ear, mind and whole person towards somebody else in time of need. Through 
these practices, primary and community healthcare (hereafter ‘primary care’) workers often act 
as ‘gatekeepers’ to healthcare services: as district nurses identifying medical needs among the 
housebound, occupational therapists enabling someone to access help needed for daily tasks 
and GPs discerning whether specialist care is appropriate.
Primary care, characterised by its generalism and by these specific practices of encounter, 
is the beginning of a road down which patients may travel, a hospitable entry point on a jour-
ney towards specialist avenues of care they may require.7 The task of primary care is then a 
demanding one, requiring clinical understanding leavened with compassion so that ‘the vast 
undifferentiated mass of human distress and suffering’8 may be ordered, personalised and then 
alleviated. To continue welcoming sufferers’ faces in the all-too-brief encounters of counte-
nances that embody compassion requires perseverance, not only through each long day but 
also, where continuity of care is maintained, over the long years during which trust may grow 
amidst the sometimes frightening but often fertile trials of life.
COMPASSION FOR PATIENTS IN PLURAL POLITIES
In practice, the character of encounters between primary care workers and patients cannot 
be generalised beyond a certain level because compassion is for this person at this time and 
because forms of primary care vary. Nonetheless thinking about compassion can be disci-
plined by understanding its nature as irreducibly concerned with personal subjects seeking 
shared experience and understanding. In many present-day societies, a complication arises. 
Although in traditional societies, a relative homogeneity of culture was common, in modern 
nation-states, this has been widely, though not universally, replaced with overlapping, inter-
secting networks of diverse, heterogeneous cultures. These multiple cultures nonetheless share 
a common political identity and, in many European contexts at least, a socialised healthcare 
system, albeit to varying degrees. Health, being ‘a basic socio-personal good’,9 valued variously 
by all cultures, therefore provides a point of reference in political life, in which the beliefs and 
practices of plural societies can meet in disciplined conversation.
Since health is both social and personal, compassion is necessarily a civic matter as an 
individual’s suffering becomes a matter of public concern, mediated through the persons of 
primary care workers. However, since present-day civic life is plural, a new understanding 
of compassion in primary care is needed. Those who seek to exercise compassion, as a form 
of affective, cognitive, participative understanding aimed at alleviating subjective suffering and 
attentive to cultural factors, must grasp the diverse ways that individual and community values 
concerning health and illness shape people’s outlook. Sharing experience involves ‘the ability 
to identify imaginatively’10 with the way that a particular patient perceives their condition and 
its significance.
Patient perception will of course include expectations about what should be done, 
if   anything, about their condition, a trend entrenched by access to medical information 
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online and ‘shared decision-making’.* More generally, personalisation of healthcare 
 relating to
a patient with respect, at least ideally, means treating their experiences, perceptions and 
preferences not just as relevant data for professional decision-making but as matters worth 
taking seriously in their own right including within decision-making partnerships.11
However, taking patient perceptions seriously does not mean that compassion involves uncrit-
ical affirmation of such perceptions. One might be tempted to think this if one failed to grasp 
compassion’s affective, cognitive, participative, alleviative nature and role in decision-making. 
Such a failure would make it harder to say ‘no’ to a patient for it allows compassion to become 
mere acquiescence not only to a patient’s perception but also to that patient’s demands. However, 
for two reasons, this uncritical notion of compassion as acquiescence should be resisted.
Firstly, while a person’s condition is their condition and they are in an important sense an 
expert in it – it is their experience and no one else’s† – conditions are not absolutely unique 
because persons are not absolutely unique. Persons are members of the species of persons, 
characterised by observable regularities of health and disease. Those who have knowledge of 
such regularities, formulated as evidence which then informs the cognitive understanding that 
constitutes compassion, are better placed than those who do not to assess diagnoses, interpre-
tations and expectations regarding health conditions and so to resist, kindly and respectfully, 
certain patient perceptions and demands.
Secondly, a patient’s perception of their condition and best interests may be challenged, 
gently and transparently, in order for the alleviative dimension of compassion to be realised. 
Compassion’s cognitive quality is ordered to seeking all patients’ good, from those patients 
who are demanding and confident about their wishes to those who do not grasp or care about 
their interests to those who, for example, feel that nicotine or alcohol use is all that makes 
life bearable but are afraid to clash with the official view, represented by the doctor, that such 
behaviour is in some way wrong. In short, how a patient perceives their circumstances may 
have much to do with culturally mediated or individually constructed values and beliefs which 
may require open, if tender, challenge.
While the paternalistic ‘doctor/nurse knows best’, presupposition is rightly no longer preva-
lent partly due to a diminution of unstudied deference in society, it is also right that primary 
care provides a context in which patient perceptions of their situation can be kindly, respectfully, 
gently and transparently but critically discussed. Inasmuch as compassion involves a cognitive 
participation in the feelings of another – in particular their experience of suffering  – then, 
compassion must incorporate this element of critical analysis and even persuasion, whereby 
suffering may be interpreted by both patient and healthcare practitioner differently and  better. 
Primary healthcare workers’ ‘power to do good’ and ‘relational expertise’ amount to social 
authority to know and pursue goodness even amidst the flat landscape of liberal political life 
that tends to discourage others’ ‘interference’ in the lives individuals are building or destroying 
for themselves.12 Such a landscape may, without the wise mediation of primary care workers, 
end up populated by people abandoned to loneliness and ill health.‡
* For a multi-perspectival analysis of this trend, see Ref. 13. For discussion of how technology will and 
perhaps should displace the face-to-face encounter in parts of healthcare, see Ref. 14.
† For weaknesses in the idea of the ‘expert patient’, see Ref. 15. 
‡ As one commentator on Edmund Pelligrino’s work puts it, ‘One cannot abandon persons to their auton-
omy when they are in difficult straits’.16 
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POWER, CRITIQUE AND THIS ‘SECULAR’ TIME
Yet, there is a dark side to compassion’s critical dimension in which persuasion or encour-
agement becomes domination and oppression and in which professional power under-
mines the patient’s own reasoning and ignores their interests. Beware the idealisation of 
the doctor as moral saint! Humanities disciplines, such as theology, have been at pains to 
analyse the fragility of individuals’ moral quality and unmask the self-deceptiveness which 
attends status and power.
Moreover, cultural wisdom garnered through engagement with patients and their cultures 
may itself function to critique a professional’s own prejudice or vice and improve the way he or 
she understands suffering and compassion. However, far from diminishing the social author-
ity of healthcare professionals, this two-way street in compassion actually reinforces their role 
as mediators in between and advocates for the individuals and cultures they serve and indeed 
between those cultures and professional, regional or government policy. This is a position of 
influence in which primary care workers are called to moral discernment in critical service of 
the population among whom they practice. Cribb and Gewirtz note this critical edge and its 
relation to justice when they comment that healthcare practitioners:
… will need an awareness that respecting the autonomy of individuals, by trying to 
respond to their needs and preferences, is not only potentially in conflict with beneficence 
to that individual, but may also exact some ‘cost’ on wider groups or populations – and 
thus may be in tension with other important concerns such as social justice or population 
effectiveness.17
The possibility of critique signals a continuing professional development need for those in 
primary care. For while the individual encounter is basic to general practice, wider cultural 
factors require primary care workers’ critically compassionate understanding. Culture is of 
course not simply local, especially in the digital age where beliefs and communities are formed 
online in dispersed networks. Nonetheless, local cultural practice remains a decisive influence 
on the lives of many. GP practices and community healthcare teams, such as church ministers, 
local authority councillors and national politicians, typically have some sense of defined geo-
graphical responsibility. Just so, primary healthcare workers must mediate between local and 
cultural expectations regarding health and what is practically possible, bearing in mind regional 
and national factors. On this point at least, there is a similarity between the account here and 
‘values-based practice’ as ‘a less prescriptive and more local approach [which] aims to introduce 
a greater variability of viewpoints and greater recognition for individually specific values.’18
To deploy a term in its traditional rather than its contemporary usage, this culturally astute 
compassion may be best dubbed ‘secular’, not at all in the sense of being ‘anti-religious’ but 
rather in its native theological sense in which ‘secular’ is a word for a Christian idea – that of 
the quality of the time in this age, when ultimate questions of the meaning of human life have 
not been finally answered and when cultures live side by side in shared ‘penultimate’ civic 
life. The ‘secular’, on this view, is the time in which diverse philosophies, theologies, religions, 
values and moral outlooks contribute respectfully and critically to a plural society’s public good. 
Inasmuch as time allows space for conversation, the secular may be thought of as the forum for 
differing forms of thought to meet in sometimes critical conversation.* Compassion,  understood 
 * See e.g. Ref. 19.
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as a cognitive, affective, critical, alleviative participation in suffering, is the proper beginning 
of the moral understanding of suffering, shaping discourse, deliberation and policy, a basic 
feature of this secular time in plural polities.
Thus, what is required is a morally substantial, affectively rich notion of ‘secular’ citizen-
ship and discourse, embedded within professional training and development and benefitting 
society at large. Primary and community healthcare services, rooted in locality and conversant 
with that locality’s cultures, are well placed to cultivate such civic discourse as the context in 
which compassion may be richly practised and experienced. A primary healthcare worker’s 
understanding of and participation in local cultural life are key to the realisation of compas-
sion in practice and so a proper focus for ongoing professional education. Inasmuch as deep 
understanding of multiple cultures is not itself a cultural norm, primary care workers must be 
countercultural if they are to be compassionate. They must be places of resistance to ways of 
perceiving cultural difference which are characterised by either impatient ignorance or uncriti-
cal acquiescence.
TIME, COMPASSION AND JUSTICE
Compassion has now been considered in terms of time in the sense of the secularity of the 
age in which political identity is now constituted. However, compassion also concerns time in 
the equally down to earth but more intuitive sense that time available to participate compas-
sionately in suffering is scarce as primary care workers move from patient to patient and home 
to home. Time is often too pressured to engage in depth with each person encountered, share 
properly in decisions or pursue ‘the search for meaning’.20
An important factor shaping this experience is the way that time and compassion are bound 
up with justice. One attitude to their interrelation is ‘to perceive healthcare rationing problems 
as involving an explicit opposition between justice and caring’.21 GPs in particular increasingly 
have responsibilities for considering how the needs of each one should be justly related to the 
needs of the very many.* The daily challenge appears in the widely attested experience of ‘no 
time’ or ‘very little time’ for compassion. Ten-minute (or briefer) appointments seem inadequate 
to create shared experience between patients and practitioners, the goal towards which com-
passion aims: a man with heart disease and depression, the teenager only needing a prescrip-
tion and the domiciliary visit which is just ‘social’. Although continuity of care may mitigate this 
problem, the dearth of time is a constant challenge which requires transparency in dialogue so 
that issues which the patient wants to address come into the open. The primary care worker can 
aid this transparency by honestly specifying how few minutes are available, thus focussing the 
conversation supportively rather than foreclosing it and avoiding difficult dialogue by handing 
out a prescription or by some other means.
However, filling the day to capacity militates against the kind of care which is required 
and leads to an ‘appointment book that lies to us about the properties of time’, precisely in its 
* Carlsen and Norheim suggest that this resource allocation responsibility involves significant chal-
lenges to maintaining a compassionate practice, as patients become ‘demanding consumers’ or ‘shared 
decision- makers’, thus reshaping – perhaps unhelpfully – societal respect for healthcare workers’ profes-
sional standing (Ref. 22). Over against the changing nature of general practice, Iona Heath mounted a 
passionate argument in favour of general practitioners’ ‘partisan’ advocacy for patients and against such 
doctors taking financial responsibility for allocation of scarce resources. For, so Heath argued, the doc-
tor’s very responsibility for allocation will be understood by patients as a threat and so undermine the 
trust necessary for his or her relationship with the doctor (Ref. 23). 
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deceptive ‘visual representation of time, setting out the day in appointment-sized chunks’,24 
which do not measure up to patient needs. That which is visible, the schedule of appoint-
ments, attempts to give structure to the underlying shared purpose upon which the patient– 
practitioner relationship is premised, that purpose of making space for compassionate shared 
experience. However, a lack of or misuse of time may result in failing to reach the goal of shared 
experience and so do injustice to some in favour of others. In this situation, time spent which is 
not answerable to a metric or budget, is the time which it may feel harder to justify.
This scarcity paradigm regarding compassion bears witness to important truths: that time is 
limited and that the GP’s appointment book and its equivalents in other forms of primary care 
are full of a weight of human need that stretches the capacities and waking hours of health-
care workers to breaking point. And yet, the paradigm may occlude the way that compassion 
is a participative, cognitive, alleviative affection. Compassion is not a 90-second feature of a 
10-minute appointment in which one asks an ‘extra’ question about the patient’s experience or 
family situation. Such a question is important in enabling shared understanding but compas-
sion is not hermetically sealed within that segment of an appointment or visit. Rather, as an 
attribute of understanding, compassion may infuse the whole encounter, focussing attention 
in listening, assessment and diagnosis, consideration of the proper use of time and resources 
and engagement in underlying personal or cultural factors. Compassion also properly includes 
a justice consideration which can grasp that another patient further down the list will suffer if 
the current appointment goes on too long. Thus, compassion is not in opposition to justice – a 
thoughtless implication of the scarcity paradigm – but rather a constitutive feature of the reali-
sation of justice. For compassion, as a cognitive, alleviative affection, is competent to under-
stand not only suffering but also any injustice which may cause further suffering.
CONCLUSION: FOSTERING COMPASSION
For compassion to be realised in practice requires a supportive organisational ethos. Compassion 
is certainly basic to the shared experiences of patients and healthcare workers in primary care 
settings. However, such experiences should be supported by compassion between primary care 
colleagues. For those who care for the suffering are themselves vulnerable members of the 
human community. The GP who provides continuous long-term care to a local community may 
journey with the population through the challenges which life inevitably throws up, sharing 
something of his or her own life and suffering in a way which benefits patients.25 Similarly, the 
experience of sharing vulnerability prudently with those with whom one works can support 
compassionate practice. Endurance in compassion towards patients will be enabled by a shared 
concern for colleagues, which is intelligent, participative and alleviative, renewing and refresh-
ing collegiality on a regular basis.
Such supportive workplace cultures rarely happen by accident and are easily endangered 
by the commodification of one’s colleagues as units of production – efficient and lauded or 
inefficient and stigmatised. Teams in general practices, district nursing or health visiting, for 
example, need to sustain a compassionate ethos if people are to see colleagues in depth, build-
ing long-term, stable, working relationships. Each primary care worker needs regular personal 
refreshment, deep drinking from some well of meaning and purpose to be sustained for the 
next stage of the journey.
Offered as one such source of refreshment in a plural polity, the motto of the Royal College 
of General Practitioners, cum scientia caritas, emphasises the greatest of the ‘three theologi-
cal virtues’, love. It stands as a reminder to those in primary care of what Health Education 
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England’s Simon Gregory called the need ‘to regain, or not be afraid to admit to, our love 
of our patients’.26 Caritas, in its theological sense, speaks of the participative, merciful and 
hopeful love of God as revealed in Jesus Christ, enabling humanity’s peaceful friendship with 
God and others. Such love serves sick and lonely persons that they might be accompanied in 
suffering and made better. Such love seeks this mercifully, never allowing the ascription of 
fault, however just, to stand in the way of that care and company. Informed by this caritas, the 
real knowledge of primary care may become true wisdom. This is love which deploys up-to-
date clinical evidence, seeks justice, rejoices in mercy and shows critical sensitivity to local-
ity and culture. It is a love which, participating in the suffering human condition, becomes 
that intelligent compassion that unites in solidarity patients, professionals, managers and 
policymakers, fellow travellers all on the journey through the world’s real sorrows, deep fears, 
enduring hopes and great joys.
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